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Shortly before the EU summit on the future of the European constitutional 
treaty, the member states have begun to put their suggestions on the 
table. Old cleavages and conflicts are beginning to resurface, and new in-
terest coalitions are becoming apparent. But in point of fact who actually 
wants what, and why? 
I 
How small is the  
“mini-treaty” advocated 
by Nicolas Sarkozy? 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy no 
longer uses the term “mini-treaty”, but 
tends to talk about a “simplified treaty”. 
He has mooted the idea that a much leaner 
treaty should replace the voluminous con-
stitution, and that this should be adopted 
as soon as possible. Furthermore, he is in 
favour of dropping anything that is remi-
niscent of the symbolism of a state (the 
term “constitution”, references to an an-
them and a flag, the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights in its entirety). The new EU 
primary law ought to incorporate only the 
institutional arrangements from the first 
part of the Constitutional Treaty. Sarkozy 
is of the opinion that this will help to dis-
pel fears of a European “super state” with-
out at the same time jettisoning badly-
needed institutional reforms. The points of 
particular importance include the intro-
duction of the “double majority”, the ex-
tension of majority voting in the Council of 
Ministers (perhaps extended by a super-
qualified decision-making procedure), the 
strengthening of the co-decision proce-
dure, the election of the President of the 
European Council, the reform of the com-
position of the Commission, structured co-
operation in security and defence policy, 
and the enhancement of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy by the ap-
pointment of a EU Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs. 
 
Thus the forthcoming treaty will probably 
not be quite that small after all. For exam- 
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ple, in order to take into account popular 
scepticism about enlargement, Sarkozy 
wishes to incorporate the Copenhagen cri-
teria into the new EU treaty. Provisions re-
lating to the areas of immigration, social, 
energy and climate change policies  could 
also be included. Thus the text of the new 
treaty would be more momentous and far 
larger than the term “mini-treaty” would 
lead one to suppose. 
 
II 
Why is the United  
Kingdom so bitterly op-
posed to the Constitu-
tional Treaty?  
Britain, it seems, is always making trouble 
and putting on the brakes. In the light of 
the innumerable objections which have 
emanated from the United Kingdom, this 
once more seems to be a fair assessment. 
In Britain the constitution was considered 
to be dead at an early stage, and the gov-
ernment is merely calling for modest al-
terations to the existing Treaty of Nice. It 
rejects constitutional symbolism of any 
kind, and is against an anthem, a flag, and 
a EU Minister for Foreign Affairs. It does 
not even wish to include a reference to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Further-
more, it believes that as many policy areas 
as possible, especially justice and home 
affairs and foreign and security policy, 
should continue to be dealt with on the na-
tional level. However, the Blair govern-
ment does not wish to be accused of being  
“Blair rejects being  
anti-European”
anti-European, for after all in certain areas 
such as energy and climate change policy 
it believes that it is doing a great deal to 
promote joint European action. Yet reach-
ing a consensus with the British is diffi-
cult for two reasons. 
 
 
On the one hand the United Kingdom is 
certainly in favour of coordinated action 
on the European level, though only on the 
basis of unanimous decision-making by 
the member states and on the premise that 
as few competences as possible will be 
transferred to Brussels. Various opt-outs 
are now being discussed in order to enable 
the British to give their assent to a new 
primary law nonetheless. As in the case of 
the Eurozone, the United Kingdom would 
thus be permitted not to implement cer-
tain steps towards greater integration. 
 
On the other hand British governments 
have traditionally been confronted with 
the dilemma of having to explain European 
decisions to a largely eurosceptical elec-
torate moulded by the conservative gutter 
press. A referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty would probably lead to its rejection, 
so that a pragmatic version of a simplified 
treaty without constitutional adornments 
which merely had to be ratified by Parlia-
ment would be advantageous as far as 
Britain is concerned. 
 
III 
Why is the existing 
method of voting so im-
portant for Poland? 
The Polish government is afraid that Ger-
many will attain a predominant position in 
the EU. That is why the weighting of votes 
in the Council of Ministers is of crucial 
importance for Poland. Its weight in 
Europe, as it is reasoned, results from how 
it compares with that of Germany. In the 
Treaty of Nice, the voting system of which 
Poland wishes to retain, Poland and Spain 
have 27 votes, and thus only two votes 
fewer than Germany and France, which 
both have much larger populations. The 
Constitutional Treaty intends to replace 
the complicated weighting of votes in the 
Council of Ministers that is currently in 
force with what is known as the “double 
majority”. Thus in a vote on a Commission 
initiative a majority would be reached if  
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55% of the member states and 65% of the 
EU population were in favour of it.  In ab-
solute terms the weight of Poland would 
change only imperceptibly as a result of 
the new regulations. However, it would be 
worse off vis-à-vis Germany, which in rela-
tive terms would now have the greatest in-
fluence in the EU.  
 
In Poland various suggestions have been 
aired on how it might be possible to en-
hance its weight. For example, the options 
of raising the double majority threshold, or 
to increasing the number of seats in the 
European Parliament are discussed. Fur-
thermore, some consideration has been 
given to rules which would make it easier 
to form blocking minorities. Alternatively 
Germany might for a transitional period 
accept a lower population figure in the vot-
ing procedure. Another option, a cap could 
be placed on the size of the population 
that is taken into account. Another de-
mand aired in circles close to the Polish 
government envisages that the future 
demographic development of Europe 
should be disregarded and that, in the 
event of a compromise, the results should 
be enshrined permanently in the institu-
tional arrangements of the EU. Thus 
France, for example, would have to agree 
to a limitation of its proportion of the 
votes even if one day it were to have more 
than 75 million inhabitants. 
 
IV 
What precisely does the 
German government 
want? 
Chancellor Angela Merkel has made a 
point of emphasizing that the “C-question” 
is right at the top of the agenda of the 
German Presidency. Germany, which has 
in fact not yet fully ratified the Constitu-
tional Treaty (a ruling by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court on the matter is still 
pending), would like to retain as much as 
possible of the substance and the institu-
tional balance of the current Constitutional 
Treaty. However, on account of the widely 
divergent interests in the various Euro-
pean capitals, Merkel has hinted that there 
is room for manoeuvre in the negotiations 
with regard to the question of the constitu-
tional symbolism. She has withdrawn a 
personal wish, which was to include a ref-
erence to God in the Constitution, on ac-
count of the secular tradition in France. 
However, Merkel is totally unwilling to ac-
cept a complete omission of references to 
European values. Indeed, one of her cen-
tral concerns is to shape the European Un-
ion as a community of values. 
 
There are great expectations that Berlin 
will provide a resounding impetus. As it is 
argued, if the Germans cannot manage it, 
then nobody will. Without the requisite 
preparatory work by the German govern-
ment, the Constitutional Treaty, a rather 
hefty morsel, would probably be too much 
for the ensuing presidencies of Portugal 
and Slovenia. In addition to a timetable the 
German government will press the June 
summit to reach a consensus on the con-
tent of the future EU primary law. 
 
Reforming the EU treaties is of great im-
portance for the European integration 
process, but it is also in the most vital in-
terests of the German government. In the 
final analysis the German EU-Presidency 
will be judged on whether or not it has 
managed to make a substantial contribu-
tion to the renewal of the treaties on 
which the EU is based. 
 
V 
Do the “Friends of the 
Constitution” hold  
identical views? 
The meeting of the “Friends of the Consti-
tution” on 26 January 2007, to which the 
Spanish government invited all the coun-
tries which have already ratified the con-
stitution or those which are in favour of 
the Constitutional Treaty, impressively 
demonstrated the determination of the  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
W
h
o
 
w
a
n
t
s
 
w
h
a
t
 
a
n
d
 
w
h
y
?
 
 
p
a
g
e
 
4
 
#
 
2
0
0
7
/
0
3
countries which want to make as few 
changes as possible to the current draft 
constitution. Above all else, the “Friends” 
agreed that, in addition to institutional re-
forms, the instruments required for the 
creation of a “political Europe” should be 
implemented, especially the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
 
Spain and Luxembourg, where a large ma-
jority of the electorate gave its assent to 
the Constitutional Treaty in a referendum, 
in particular are adamant that there 
should be as few changes to the text as 
possible. At the most it might be possible 
to imagine additional protocols in areas 
such as energy and climate change policy, 
enlargement, immigration, defence or so-
cial policy. They clearly reject the idea of 
an abbreviated text. Italian Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi also wishes to retain the 
“beautiful” Constitutional Treaty, prefera-
bly in its original form. Belgian Prime Min-
ister Guy Verhofstadt has made a similar 
plea in Belgium a new treaty would have 
to be ratified not only by the Parliament, 
but also by the three regional parliaments 
and the parliaments of the German and 
French communities. 
 
VI 
What is behind the threat 
of a “Core Europe”? 
The “Core Europe” catchword has made a 
revival. If it proves impossible to reach a 
compromise with regard to the constitu-
tional issue, Italian Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi warned in his speech to the 
European Parliament on 22 May 2007, 
then “a vanguard of countries could be the 
best way to proceed towards a more inte-
grated union.” Belgian Prime Minister Guy 
Verhofstadt even wants to go a step fur-
ther and establish the “United States of 
Europe”, which would unite all of the 
member states of the European Union, but 
if need be only a few pioneers. The coun-
tries of the Eurozone would constitute the  
gravitational centre for the other members 
of the EU. 
“Examples of a Europe of 
different speeds already 
exist.” 
Those in favour of the constitution are 
mooting the idea of setting up a new Un-
ion within the EU in the knowledge that 
Poland and the Czech Republic do not 
have a future outside the EU, that the 
Netherlands as a founding member con-
s i d e r s  i t s e l f  t o  b e  p a r t  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  
core, and that even the United Kingdom, if 
the worst comes to the worst, will always 
prefer to put on the brakes inside than to 
be left out in the cold. This option is very 
unlikely to materialize, for the current cri-
sis is far too insignificant and the poten-
tial participants do not display a pro-
nounced interest in deeper integration. 
Some of the “Friends of the Constitution” 
nevertheless hope that this threatening 
gesture might persuade opponents of the 
constitution to drop their objections. 
 
However, examples of a Europe of differ-
ent speeds already exist, for example, the 
Schengen cooperation or the Treaty of 
Prüm. When confronted with a Union of 27 
or more member states, the instrument of 
differentiation provides the necessary 
room for manoeuvre, so that in certain ar-
eas it becomes possible to move ahead 
more quickly. The spectre of a “Core 
Europe” should not lead us to cast doubt 
on the potential embedded in the idea of 
differentiation. 
 
VII 
How united are the  
opponents of the  
Constitutional Treaty? 
The opponents of the Constitutional Treaty 
agree on only one thing, and that is that 
they wish to avoid having referendums in 
their countries. This is the reason why  
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France, the United Kingdom and the Neth-
erlands are so keen to retain the method of 
successive treaty amendment employed 
hitherto. However, what the various coun-
tries wish to amend is different, partly for 
domestic policy reasons. 
 
The Polish government insists that 
changes will have to be made to the envis-
aged “double majority”, and thereby calls 
into question the very core of the Constitu-
tional Treaty. The Czech government 
wishes to incorporate a passage into the 
new primary law which will make it possi-
ble to restore European competences to 
the national decision-making level. The 
specific demands being made by the Dutch 
government are now also of a rather far-
reaching nature. It is seeking more rights 
for the national parliaments and clear-cut 
guarantees about the member states’ re-
sponsibility in individual areas such as so-
cial policy and education. On the British 
agenda are the complete removal of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the re-
tention of British veto rights in as many 
policy areas as possible. 
“Reacting to widespread 
fears of a European  
super state.” 
In the negotiations the room for manoeu-
vre of the various countries is significantly 
different. Whereas it is true that the 
French electorate rejected the Constitu-
tional Treaty, President Nicolas Sarkozy, 
on account of his resounding election vic-
tory, has a bigger freedom to act. The 
 
situation in the Netherlands is rather dif-
ferent. Prime Minister Jan Peter Bal-
kenende, reacting to widespread fears of a 
“European super state”, places great em-
phasis on elements in the new treaty 
which reinforce national sovereignty. By 
announcing that he intends to resign di-
rectly after the summit, Tony Blair has in-
creased the British government’s room for 
manoeuvre in the negotiations. No matter 
what the compromise looks like, it will be 
Blair and not his successor Gordon Brown 
who will have to bear the responsibility for 
it. In Poland the situation is far more com-
plicated. Thus, even if the Polish govern-
ment fails to secure support for its sugges-
tions pertaining to the weighting of votes, 
it must receive something by way of com-
pensation. 
 
VIII 
Where is there room for 
manoeuvre, and where is 
the “red line”? 
The member states of the EU are fully 
aware of the fact that amendment of pri-
mary law reforms in the context of the in-
creasingly heterogeneous interests in a 
EU-27 will not necessarily lead to an im-
provement on what was achieved by the 
European Convention. For this reason the 
EU is supposed to adopt the institutional 
innovations of the Constitutional Treaty. 
They include the extension of the majority 
voting in the Council of Ministers, the 
strengthening of the co-decision rights of 
the European Parliament, the reform of the 
composition of the Commission, and the 
election of the President of the European 
Council. 
 
According to Angela Merkel, the President 
of the Council, the adoption of the “double 
majority” in the Council of Ministers, 
which Poland has described as unaccept-
able, is non-negotiable. Furthermore, na-
tional parliaments will not receive veto 
rights as demanded by Poland and the 
Czech Republic. The United Kingdom will 
also have to give up some of its more far-
reaching demands. It seems probable that 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights will be 
mentioned, at least with a reference to the 
actual text. 
 
However, apart these “diehards”, there is 
certainly room for manoeuvre in the nego-
tiations, though this will necessitate the 
use of “scissors” and “pens”. Any kind of 
state symbolism such as the term “consti-
tution”, the reference to the symbols and 
the anthem of the European Union, and the  
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term “European Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs” will probably be discarded. Fur-
thermore, parts of the planned extension 
of majority decisions in the Council could 
fall victim to the cuts. As has already been 
suggested with regard to the United King-
dom, there could also be various opt-outs 
in certain policy areas such as justice and 
home affairs. 
 
The incorporation of a reference to the so-
cial dimension of European integration is 
above all designed to placate the French 
electorate. Many French citizens perceived 
the constitution to be the Trojan horse of 
globalization, liberalization and border-
lessness, and rejected it for that reason. 
Furthermore, policy areas such as energy, 
climate change and immigration are to be 
included as joint tasks. In addition to this, 
the Copenhagen criteria are to be incorpo-
rated into the treaty as a result of the mis-
givings about further enlargement voiced 
especially in the Dutch and French refer-
enda.  
 
IX 
How does the “summit 
strategy” of the member 
states look like? 
The strategy of the individual EU member 
states is on the one hand determined by 
their attitudes towards the draft Constitu-
tional Treaty. In other words, they are ei-
ther for or against it. In this context it is 
not particularly important whether or not 
they have ratified the Constitutional 
Treaty. On the other hand, over and above 
their approach to the contents of the 
treaty, the countries differ with regard to 
their willingness to negotiate. If these two 
components are plotted on a graph, it is 
possible to identify five separate strategies 
pursued by discrete groups of member 
states. 
 
The first group (“rather without you than 
nothing”) includes the most vocal support-
ers of the constitution. They have only re-
cently made it clear that they are not pre-
pared to relinquish the central elements of 
the constitution. Italy, Luxembourg and 
Belgium form the spearhead of this group, 
which have openly threatened to create a 
“Core Europe” or a two-speed Europe. 
Spain also wishes to change as little as 
possible. 
“The German Strategy: 
Europe needs to  
compromise.” 
“Europe needs to compromise” would be a 
way of describing the German strategy. 
When it assumed the Presidency of the 
European Council, the German govern-
ment’s vehement support for the retention 
of the Constitutional Treaty gave way to a 
more pragmatic approach. The EU 27, so 
the reasoning goes, is no longer govern-
able on the basis of the Treaty of Nice. 
That is why the Presidency of the Council 
continues to cling to the institutional 
achievements of the Constitutional Treaty. 
The Scandinavian countries have also un-
derlined the need for a compromise. 
 
France, under the leadership of Nicolas 
Sarkozy, is in favour of a simplified treaty, 
which is illustrated by the motto “the con-
stitution is dead, long live the treaty”. Al-
though France, like the Netherlands, re-
jected the Constitutional Treaty, it wishes 
to incorporate into a new treaty as much of 
the current draft as possible. Sarkozy’s 
general willingness to compromise means 
that he is closer to the supporters of the 
constitution than to its opponents. 
 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
have “the electorate breathing down their 
necks”. In traditionally eurosceptical Brit-
ain, even the Blair government, despite its 
greater room for manoeuvre in the nego-
tiations, has to take into account the mood 
of the public and dispel suspicions that 
sovereignty is being transferred to Brus-
sels. The Dutch government is faced with a 
similar dilemma, which is complicated by 
the fact that on the European level it cer- 
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tainly does not wish to be perceived as be-
ing obstructionist. 
 
Until recently the Polish government pur-
sued an “all or nothing” strategy. There 
was an openly expressed threat that it 
would wreck the constitutional summit if 
it proved impossible to find a compromise 
with regard to the question of the “double 
In any cas
majority”. 
e, at the summit the member 
states will not reach agreement about the 
final version of the new primary law, but, 
providing they make it a success, will 
merely define its outlines. An Intergov-
ernmental Conference with a precisely de-
fined mandate could then finalize the 
small print under the Portuguese Presi-
dency of the Council. It would be useful to 
set a target date. Europe’s governing poli-
ticians could sign the new document by 
the end of the year, or they could wait un-
til the Slovenian Presidency. A “Treaty of 
Ljubljana” would be a telling symbol for 
the new member states of the EU. 
 
X 
In case of failure, is there 
On account  ent po-
ceed jointly on the basis of the Constitu-
aci-
ted if it once more proved impossible to 
a “Plan B”? 
of the extremely diverg
sitions of the various governments, it can 
not be assumed that the renewed attempt 
to reform the EU’s primary law will actu-
ally be a success. Various options are thus 
being considered in case the new EU 
treaty once again cannot be ratified by all 
member states. It is currently unrealistic 
to envisage a withdrawal of the states 
which are unable to give their assent to a 
revision of the treaty, or the foundation of 
a new Union by states which wish to pro-
tional Treaty. The political and economic 
costs for all of the countries which are not 
involved would be far too high. This time 
round there is once again no “Plan B”. 
 
However, the EU would not be incap
ta
introduce the proposed treaty amend-
ments. The institutions would continue to 
function on the basis of the Treaty of Nice, 
and it would also be possible to implement 
certain reforms envisaged in the Constitu-
tional Treaty without resorting to the pro-
tracted treaty amendment procedure. 
Prominent examples of this are the al-
ready established European Defence 
Agency, the opening of meetings of the 
Council of Ministers to the media and the 
public, or the enhanced involvement of na-
tional parliaments in the EU decision-
making process. Over and above this, mi-
nor reforms can be implemented with the 
help of inter-institutional agreements. Fur-
thermore, the Open Method of Coordina-
tion makes it possible to take joint action  
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in areas which are not covered by the 
competences of the Union. 
 
However, it will not be pos
m
the decision-making procedure such as the 
extension of majority decisions in the 
Council and the strengthening of the co-
decision procedure without the usual 
treaty amendment process based on una-
nimity. Therefore, there is certainly a need 
for a kind of “Treaty amending the Treaty 
of Nice”. Otherwise there would continue 
to be striking shortcomings and imperfec-
tions with regard to transparency, effi-
ciency, participation, and the democratic 
structures of the European Union. 
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